

THE
SENTIMENTS

OF AN IMPARTIAL

Member of Parliament, &c.

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THE
STIMULANT

OF THE
SOUTHERN

AND
WESTERN

T H E
SENTIMENTS

OF AN IMPARTIAL

Member of Parliament,

U P O N

The two following Questions,

- 1. Whether GREAT-BRITAIN ought to be desirous of a Peace in the present Situation of her Affairs?**
- 2. What Sort of a Peace GREAT-BRITAIN has Reason to expect?**



L O N D O N :


**Printed for T. BECKET and P. A. DE HONDT,
in the Strand. MDCCLXII.**

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THE
SENTIMENTS
OF AN
Impartial Member of Parliament, &c.

OUGHT Great Britain, in the present situation of her affairs, to be desirous of a peace with her enemies?

THE dispassionate Author of the following pages, with all due deference to the wisdom of his superiors, humbly thinks that she ought. —And he founds his opinion upon the following reasons:

1.

Because peace in general, especially to a commercial nation, is preferable to war.

This proposition will stand in no need of a particular proof to such as are acquainted with the tender feelings of humanity, and have a proper regard for the unutterable sufferings of those multi-

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tudes of their fellow creatures, who are rendered miserable during the course of a long war.

If the war prove unsuccessful, (and who will be sanguine enough to insure a constant success) there is a stop put, greater or less, as it may happen, both to foreign and domestic trade, and the merchant, and the manufacturer, and the husbandman, and the landholder, are all involved in one common distress.

And if the war be blessed with a series of uninterrupted success, who, after all, are the immediate and great gainers by it, but the contractors for the government?—But commissaries, usurers, hucksters of money, brokers in the alley, and commanders of fleets and armies? For experience doth not evince, that either the bulk of the victorious nation, upon whom alone the weight of taxes falls, grows wealthier even by a prosperous war; or that the government becomes richer.—On the contrary, experience does evince, that, during the most prosperous war, the price of labour is continually rising, the value of the home manufacture advancing, and the foreign commodity not to be purchased, but at a dearer rate.—Experience evinces, that luxury and extravagance, are continually introducing by the fortunate merchant, commissary, commander, &c. to the corruption of the morals of the triumphant state; whilst distress, and envy, and repining, pursue and torment such as have only fixed incomes to
live

live upon, unconnected with any of the above-mentioned means of increasing their fortunes.

2.

A second reason, why Great-Britain should be desirous of a peace, is, because *through the long continuance, and astonishing extent of the war, she is almost exhausted both of men and money.*

Her frequent victories, though it would be hard to assert that they have ruined, yet surely, we may venture to say that they have extremely weakened her.

That we have not men sufficient to supply our still growing demands for the war, I may boldly appeal to the deficient muster rolls, both of our army and navy, notwithstanding the activity of their respective officers in raising recruits; and that we have not men enough to supply the constant and necessary calls of our traffick, I may, with the same confidence of truth, appeal to the heavy complaints, which we hear every day, made by our tradesmen, manufacturers, and husbandmen, of the want of proper hands to carry on their several businesses and professions, in the extent and manner they could wish.

But I said, that we were almost exhausted of our money, as well as of our most active and useful

hands: And is not this a truth too manifest, not to be immediately acknowledged by every attentive observer?

That there is money in the nation, distributed amongst individuals, sufficient for all the purposes, even of this extensive war, may perhaps be allowed;—but what is that to the government? And of what advantage is it to the government in the present case, that so many immense fortunes have been made during the war?

That there is as much specie in the nation now, as there was at the commencement of the war, should any knowing person assert, I should hear his assertion with much pleasure, and wish it to be true: I certainly should not dispute the point with him.

But still he must give me leave to ask in my turn, what is the government, *as such*, the better for this money, whilst it continues in the pockets of individuals, and proper means cannot be found to come at it?

You tell me that a half per cent. more than the marketable price of the stocks, will at all times call forth this money; and that upon these, or even better terms than these, the government may always command whatever sums they may have occasion for.—I believe they may. But will any man
lend

lend his money; or rather will the government venture to borrow large sums of monies, unless they have previously thought of, and provided adequate and admissible taxes to pay the interest of the sums thus borrowed by them? Here then is the difficulty, and a difficulty, I fear, it is, not easily to be surmounted.

For what commodity, what necessary of life is there, which is not already taxed (highly taxed) to discharge the annual interest of a national debt of one hundred and thirty millions sterling? And where will new funds be found out to pay the interest of ten millions more (at least) of new money, which must be raised for the supplies of the next year, if the war continue? That such funds are prepared for the service of the coming year, I am persuaded, though I know not what they are; but if another year, and another after that, must be added to the account, who can answer for the event? *When the bow-string is stretched to the utmost, the next strain must break it.*

I have heard it asserted by knowing persons, who have made the comparison (though I will not vouch for the truth of a fact which I am not able to examine myself) that more money was actually paid by the people of the small island of Great-Britain, the last year, to defray the variety of charges laid upon them, in consequence of acts of parliament,

parliament, than was ever raised upon the whole Roman Empire in any one year, from the perpetual dictatorship of Julius Cæsar, to the reign of Constantine the Great.

But do not dogs, and fwords, and superfluous servants, and play-house tickets, remain to be taxed? And why is not a duty laid upon these, and other instruments of our national luxury?—Because taxes imposed upon things of this nature, are liable to perpetual disputes in fixing and collecting; because funds arising from objects of this nature, will be in a great measure precarious; because in their utmost extent and valuation, they will go but a very little way towards paying the interest of ten millions of money at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

But as this is a point of the utmost consequence, and, I apprehend, not so generally and fully attended to, as its extreme importance deserves; you must permit me to dwell a moment longer upon it.

That there is a sufficient quantity of money in the nation, to answer the largest demands of the government, may be readily allowed.—But you will be pleased to answer me, whether in order to draw this money out of the pockets of individuals, new funds must not be established to pay the annual interest of such new money, as shall be raised for the service of the current year? Whether the

annual expences of the government are not advanced to such an enormous height, as that no new tax can be thought of, sufficient to discharge the increasing annual interest, except it be laid upon the necessaries of life? Is there a necessary of life, possible to be taxed, which is not already taxed to a considerable value? Do not the first weight and pressure of all taxes, fall upon the real strength of the nation, the middling gentry, and the middling people of all professions? Does not every new tax, laid upon the necessaries of life, occasion much distress, distrust and clamour against the government, and provoke much murmurings against the best of sovereigns? And has not such distress, distrust, murmurings and clamour, a natural tendency to encrease the voice of faction, and to promote complaining, caballing, and sedition? It is the *last pound* which is put on the back of the horse, which presses him to the ground; and who will venture to say, *which is the last pound?*—

But the sinking fund is encreasing, is swelling, is over-flowing; and why may not its large annual produce be made to supply the place of new taxes?

Oh! Let that fund be ever sacred and inviolate! Let no parliament lay unhallowed hands upon that sacred fund, beyond what may be expedient to *alleviate the demands* of the current year! Let not its produce be ever mortgaged to pay the interest of the

the annual supplies! For it is our present hope, and the real security of our posterity.—It is this sacred fund, which, in the hour of peace, must lighten the immense debt we groan under: It is this fund which must preserve us from any future insults, or injuries, of the neighbouring nations.

3.

A third reason why Great-Britain should be desirous of peace, results from a calm, serious and impartial review of her present internal situation.

And is this situation such as an enemy to faction, a lover of domestic peace, a loyal subject of his prince, and a sincere friend of his country would wish? Why then move thus heavily the wheels of government; and why these suspicions, murmurings, complainings, mutual abuses and accusations, which we hear every day humming in our affrighted ears?

Where are the men of business and experience at this critical conjuncture? Where are the men who so long enjoyed the sunshine of their prince's favour? Where is the D— of N——? Where is the E— of H——? Where is Mr. P——? And why have they fled the cabinet of their prince, as if it were infected with the plague? Is it, merely, because they cannot rule in it with the same untroubled authority, which they formerly exercised?

Is

Is it because they cannot *dictate* to their sovereign? Is it because they cannot influence and *guide* every measure of government? Is it because the prince, whose goodness they so frequently profess to love and admire, is pleased to attend to the counsels of another person, to hear his advice also, with particular attention, and sometimes, perhaps, prefer it to theirs, when it falls in better with his own way of thinking? Is there then no medium between advising and dictating? Or is it a discredit, a dishonour, and the ruin of a privy counsellor, not to have his advice always followed?—These cannot be the sentiments of men, who have each of them, in his turn, assured their fellow counsellors in the cabinet, that it was no disgrace to them to be guided by the mature, and well digested plans of a first minister.

I will not therefore believe so meanly of the high personages, whom I have had the honour to mention above: their characters for patriotism, are too well established to leave the least opening for such injurious surmises concerning them. They know, and they profess, that the honour of their sovereign, and the interest of their country, should be, and is, dearer to them than all other considerations, arising from private prejudice, pique, envy or resentment; and they have, each in his turn, largely felt the benign effect of his majesty's goodness to them, and their families.

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They

They know that the constitution has given his majesty power to chuse his own servants; to follow the advice which is most agreeable to his own sentiments and conscience; and we have heard them, each in his turn, pleading for this undoubted privilege of their sovereign, whilst they looked upon themselves as the happy objects of his choice. Can they therefore be now discontented, merely because they imagine, that his majesty has a greater regard for the persons, and more confidence in the counsels of other people, than of them?

I am not here pleading the cause of L. B. or of any other particular person, whom his m——— may delight to honour: but I am pleading the cause of my king and country; the cause of unanimity and concord; the cause of these high personages themselves, whose respectable names we hear so often abused by their ambitious friends, under the notion of their being discontented at the publick measures, and ready to oppose every kind of peace, which shall be concluded by the present servants of the crown.

Justice however commands us to add, that *hitherto* the noble person, who seems to be the envied object of publick clamour, and publick calumny, has certainly done nothing which can render him unworthy the high post which he holds in the government. *Hitherto* we know nothing certain concerning this obnoxious person, but that he is
 2 universally

universally allowed to be a good husband, a good father, a good friend, a good economist, and a punctual payer of his debts. *Hitherto* we know nothing certain concerning him, but that he is born a Scotsman; and that his majesty thinks himself obliged to him for his long and inviolable attachment to his person; and particularly, for the important services which he received from him the four years immediately preceding his coming to the crown. *Hitherto* we know nothing certain concerning him, but that, during the short time, wherein his majesty has been supposed to hearken to his advice, preferably to that of others, more scholars, as such, more men of science and polite literature, have had provisions made for them, than have been made for persons of this class, the whole fifty preceding years. *Hitherto* we know nothing certain of him, but that he began his administration by saving the nation 500,000*l.* in the vote of credit for the current year; chose not to give his assent to remit another 670,000*l.* to the king of Prussia, and is charged with having too high principles of heroism! *Hitherto* we know nothing certain concerning this obnoxious person, but that in obedience to the universal voice of the people, concurring with his own sentiments, he has endeavoured to put an honourable end to the immensely expensive war in Germany; has conquered the Havannah; has destroyed a fourth part of the navy of Spain; has recovered Newfoundland; left, perhaps, in too defenceless a condition by his pre-

decessors in the ministry ; and has been indefatigable in his labours, to give his country the so ardently to be wished for blessings of a good peace.

But from the moment wherein it shall appear from facts, that he is a man of inferior abilities, and incapable of supporting the weight of the high post to which his royal master has advanced him ; that he gives bad advice to the crown, that he suffers himself to be misled by wrong maxims ; that he understands not the true interest of the kingdom, with regard to its commercial and foreign connections ; and that he aims at undermining its internal constitution—let him be called to immediate account ; let him answer for his weakness, wickedness, and folly, as the constitution directs he should, at the tribunal of parliament.—His majesty has too great a love for, and too great a regard for the happiness of his people, not to give him up, in that case, to the justice of the nation ;—and, if the voice of rumour may be hearkened to, he himself neither asks, nor desires any thing from his country, but the *strictest Justice*. But if the mere place of birth, if suspicion of incapacity, if whispers of want of ability, in contradiction to well known facts, must be made matter of accusation, and be used as engines to destroy the servants of the crown ; what wise or honest man is there, but must wish for times, when such factious dispositions will do less mischief than at present?—

And

And ought not Great-Britain to be desirous of a peace with her foreign enemies, whenever the cries of seditious clamour, prejudice, defamation, and discontent, raise themselves above the still voice of sober truth, shake off every appeal to reason, and threaten us with all the dire effects of discord and disunion?

4.

Does there appear to be any reason, why Great-Britain should not be desirous of a peace, when she considers her present situation, relatively to her allies?

Think not that I am here going to enquire into, much less to endeavour to settle, the extremely complex and intricate question, which has so long tormented our deepest politicians; namely, “whether this island ought ever to interfere with her armies in the affairs of the continent.” She has frequently interposed with her armies, in the affairs of her neighbours, upon the continent, for more than 300 years past, sometimes with great, sometimes with less success.

But then she has never (till lately) interfered, but at the earnest request of *her allies themselves*; of *allies, able*, and willing to concur with their whole force, to support her active measures; of *allies,*
whose

whose preservation was thought to be absolutely necessary to support that trembling balance of power in Europe, and who, probably, could not have been preserved from immediate destruction, but by our seasonable and powerful interposition.

But was this the case, *at first*, of the war upon the European continent; or is it the case *at present*? Our allies are said to *have* detested, and still to detest the war, wherein we forced them, as it were, to engage, and wherein we now hold them, (may it not be said) against their wills.

See *Hanover* and *Hesse*, and *Brunswicke*, stretching forth their emaciated hands, and lifting up their feeble eyes to us in supplication, *to give them peace*.—— “ Give us peace that we may renew
 “ our exhausted strength, before we are irrecover-
 “ ably undone and ruined. Our young men are
 “ destroyed in your service, and our untilled lands
 “ imbrued with the most valuable blood of our
 “ husbandmen and labourers. Look at the muster-rolls of those very troops, which you are supposed to pay for, are they nearly full? We cannot possibly fill them; for we have none but old
 “ men and children left in our depopulated country. Our houses have been plundered, and our towns miserably pillaged and burnt. Your
 “ wealth may, indeed, make some sort of recompence, some sort of indemnification to our sovereigns,
 “ reigns,

“ reigns, for driving them into a hated war against
 “ their wills, and against their interests; but where
 “ is the recompense, where the indemnification of
 “ the impoverished subject, torn from his weeping
 “ wife, robbed of his children, and deprived of
 “ his property? What have we to do? How are
 “ we concerned, in your commercial quarrels with
 “ France and Spain, about your respective boun-
 “ daries in North America? Tell us not that we
 “ shall fall a sacrifice to French perfidy and ambi-
 “ tion, unless, from time to time, you interpose
 “ between us and destruction. We know better
 “ than this. The days of Lewis the XIVth have
 “ been passed these 50 years; and you may now
 “ leave Germany to fight her own battles. Ger-
 “ many has been ever famous for her love of li-
 “ berty, and would still be as ready, as she is able,
 “ to maintain her ancient independency against all
 “ attacks that could be made upon her from with-
 “ out, had not the temptation of your overflowing
 “ wealth, corrupted the very souls of our great
 “ men, and destroyed every principle of real pa-
 “ triotism amongst us. The French, in the present
 “ situation of their country, in the situation wherein
 “ their country has been for many years past, can
 “ entertain no serious thoughts of making a fixed
 “ settlement on this side the Rhine. They know,
 “ that in such a case, every German patriot, (and
 “ in such a case, every German would be a patriot)
 “ would unite together against them, to expel the
 “ common

“ common enemy. France has expressly guarantied
 “ our liberty, mutual independance and religion,
 “ by the treaty of Westphalia; and she cannot, but
 “ be well persuaded, from experience, as well as
 “ the reason of the thing itself, that she will not
 “ easily find her interest in acting contrary either
 “ to the letter or spirit of this famous treaty.—
 “ Give us therefore peace, that we may have time
 “ to breathe a little in freedom, and to recover our-
 “ selves from the immense Losses of a tedious war,
 “ wherein we have suffered, little less, from the li-
 “ centious protection of our friends, than from the
 “ invasion of our enemies.”

Nor is there any thing, I imagine, *in the king of Prussia's present connection with this nation*, which ought to render Great-Britain less desirous of a peace on his account. If this magnanimous prince has been really useful to us, in the course of this tedious war, we certainly, in return, have saved him and his country from falling a prey to the extensive and destructive projects of his provoked, numerous and inveterate enemies. I pretend not to know, what may have formerly passed between his Prussian majesty and our ministers, or what engagements may have been lately entered into between the two courts; only thus much I may safely venture to assert, that as self-preservation is the first law of nature, of states as well as of private persons, no treaty nor engagement, can bind a nation to sell itself, to certain ruin, for the sake of an ally.

Hitherto

Hitherto we have generously contributed to sustain the king of Prussia's cause, both with our money, and by the diversion of our armies.—But neither our own wasting strength, nor the situation of our ally, during the neutrality of Russia and Sweden, and the impotence of the army of the empire, seem to require that we should make any farther efforts in his favour, or do more for him, than can be brought about by our mediation, good offices, and friendly interposition with his enemies. He is now become, by the recovery of the important town of Schweidnitz, more than a match for any power which the house of Austria can bring against him, and may *command* a good peace from his exhausted enemy: Such a peace as he may ask with reason, and her Hungarian majesty come into, without any detriment to the essential interests of her family.

Follow then, great prince, follow the propensities of your natural disposition to benevolence! Harken to the voice of one of the strongest reasons, which ever possessed and informed the human soul, and obey the loud calls of humanity.—Be a father to the sufferings of your miserable subjects, who almost adore the immense abilities of their prince, and give them that ease and tranquillity, which they so ardently aspire after. Seek your own real glory, in pursuing the true ends for which government was ordained, in cultivating the arts of society; and rendering the people, who depend

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upon

upon your care and protection, happy : Finish one of the greatest characters, perhaps, which has ever appeared in the world, by using the extraordinary power of mind, with which God Almighty has furnished you, to reconcile the interests of jarring nations, and to place the peace of Europe, upon a solid foundation ; a foundation, which shall not easily be shaken, at the capricious will of a weak prince ; or by the factious intrigues of a self-interested Minister.

Alas for Portugal ! Alas indeed ! For the sake, therefore, of this wretched country, so perfidiously invaded and over-run by the Spaniards, Great-Britain cannot but be desirous of a peace ; of a peace which shall restore our enervated ally, in whose fate we are supposed to be nearly interested, to her former state of tranquillity.—For by a war, it is too much to be apprehended, that we shall never be able to preserve her from falling a prey to the house of Bourbon. For what can a few British troops do, and more cannot, as yet, be sent without endangering our own security ; what, I say, (even against Spaniards) can a few British troops do, entirely unsupported by the natives themselves, who, it is too well known, have not kept any one of their engagements, which they made with us, before our arrival in their country ; who have neither army effectually to assist us ; nor magazines, nor discipline, nor fortifications ?

If

5.

If then, neither a serious consideration of our own internal state, nor any impartial review of the present condition of our allies, and of our connection with them, ought to prevent Great-Britain from being desirous of an immediate peace; let us, in the next place, see, *Whether there be any thing in the particular situation of our enemies, which ought to alienate our thoughts from entering into terms of pacification with them.*

The mighty are indeed fallen! *The French*, divided in the cabinet, have been disappointed in every plan, both of council and action, and beaten in every part of the world. The fertile resources of their abounding wealth are extremely diminished: Their choicest troops are either slain by the edge of the sword, or fallen victims to the havock of disease: Their stores of war are exhausted: Their merchant ships taken, or unemployed in their ports: Their naval power almost annihilated, and the ancient reputation of their courage and military skill, well-nigh perished. Nor are their allies in a much more preferable condition.

The *Spanish nation*, in general, is extremely uneasy and discontented at an unprovoked war, wantonly drawn upon them by the intrigues of France, and the influence of foreign councils. The returns of their wealth from America, are, in a measure,

cut off, and their commerce stopped: Some of their richest vessels are already taken or destroyed; and their best appointed men of war, fallen into our hands. The key to all their American dominions is seized into our possession, and their hearts are trembling with fear for every valuable port, and every valuable territory, which they still retain in that remote part of the world. They have, indeed, remaining, the bare hopes of making themselves some poor amends for the losses they have already sustained, and still expect to sustain, by their conquests in Portugal.—May these hopes prove as false, as their invasion of that miserable country, was treacherous and detestable.—If driven to extreme necessity, Portugal may still rouse and exert herself; may still faithfully and punctually courageously co-operate with her steady ally; and then what mighty effects may not reasonably be expected from the surprizing efforts of British valour?

The question, therefore, now to be examined and decided, is, Whether, in political prudence, we ought to take advantage of this wretched state of our enemies, and still go on, adding conquest to conquest?—Or, Whether it be not most adviseable to lay hold of the present favourable moment of our glory, and of our successes, to give our enemies the peace, which they appear to be so anxious to conclude with us?

They

They who are of opinion, that we ought to lay hold of the present favourable moment of success and glory, to conclude a peace, think that they are able to vindicate and maintain their pacific sentiments from the following considerations.

If *France*, say they, should once come to be really persuaded, that her utter disgrace and ruin are intended by us, who knows what mighty effects despair may produce in a nation abounding in people; not deficient in untried resources; full of manufactures; blessed with a large internal and European commerce; devoted to the glory of their prince; strengthened with impregnable ports, full of privateers; and famous (at least in former times) for their valour and policy?—Who knows what mighty effects despair may produce in a nation supported by the riches of Peru and Mexico, as far as these riches can escape the vigilance of our cruisers, which will sometimes be the case;—in a nation, which, upon the present supposition, will have the good wishes, prayers, and perhaps the open, as well as underhand assistance of every kingdom in Europe, to favour their defensive measures?—Are not those mighty fleets, which are our ornament, our confidence, and our strength, liable to the destruction of storm and tempest?—Have we really nothing to apprehend from domestic disunion?—And can there be a greater contempt of
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the goodness of divine providence, than to abuse the power, with which heaven has intrusted us, to the slaughter and ruin of our fellow creatures?

But let it be supposed, that victory bound, as it were, to our standards, must still accompany our military expeditions; that all will be contentment, union and tranquillity at home, and that we are certain of triumphing over our enemies, wherever our fleets and armies appear.—And will you set no limits to your ambitious acquisitions, but be perpetually going on to join port to port, island to island, and province to province?—But how will you be able to hold and preserve the places, which shall be reduced by you? You will put strong garrisons into them, you say. But where will you find fresh troops to supply the amazing consumption of the war, and the terrible havock of distemper, when these troops are dispersed under so many different climates? But granting that supplies of new soldiers could be found for the use of your numerous garrisons, armies and fleets;—may it not reasonably be asked, where the government, whose resources have long been upon the utmost stretch, will find money to pay them a few years longer? The manes of Athens, and Lacedemon, and Carthage, and Rome, will tell you, that states may out-conquer themselves; that there ought always to be a due proportion between the mother country, and its foreign

reign acquisitions ; that commercial nations have nothing to do with offensive wars ; and that states have frequently sunk under the enormous weight of their own bulk.

But these conquests, it is replied, will be able to support themselves without putting Great-Britain to any further expence.— They will, indeed, abundantly help to support the commissary who supplies them with stores and provisions : they will, indeed, enrich the merchant and planter, whose commerce will be increased by them ; and they will also make some addition to the produce of the national customs ;—but what will this contribute towards answering the large demands of government, which, upon the plan of conquest, must continually go on, increasing its annual expences ; at least, will find no speedy opportunity of reducing them, within such bounds, as that the whole of the annual charge, may be raised within the year.

But let me once more seriously ask you : Where will you, or where can you stop upon this ambitious plan ? If the war continue, you lay yourselves under a necessity of vigorously pursuing your conquests. Nor must your fleets and armies be suffered to lie idle and unemployed ; for that will never be endured by a nation fond of action, and always craving after novelty.

But

But if you go on to reduce, as certainly seems to be in your power, the remaining Spanish ports in America, the consequence is plain and obvious : Peru and Mexico must fall into your power or dependance. For when all communication of these immensely rich and luxurious countries, with their mother-country, is cut off, they will, of course, fly to you for protection, and for those continual supplies of European commodities, which are now become necessary for their convenient and comfortable subsistence. *But with the mines of Mexico and Peru at her disposal, alas for rich old England! Alas! Alas!*—But you reply, *Now, now* is the opportunity to retaliate former injuries ; to humble, for ever to humble, the pride of the house of Bourbon, that ambitious and perfidious family, who is ever contriving and watching for our ruin :—*Now*, you say, is the time to display the depth of our wisdom, to convince all Europe of the superiority of our politics, as well as of our arms ; and to keep our enemies under, so that they may never hereafter rise to hurt us.

How weak is human foresight, and how sudden are the revolutions of states and empires!

Behold us then, for a moment, in full possession of what our adversaries have long charged us, in every court of Europe, with aiming at.—Behold

us the masters, the sovereigns, the tyrants of the sea.—Behold us universal monarchs of the ocean, and prescribing laws to all the maritime force of Europe. But short, I fear, will be our day of triumph; and an universal monarchy at sea, will no more be suffered with patience, than a monarchy of the same influence and extent at land. Would not Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Russia, would not every maritime state in Europe; would not every state in Europe, though utterly unconnected with the sea, enter into public and private leagues and associations, to reduce a power that was become so dangerous to their most essential interests? And from whence, upon this supposition, could we procure the immense quantities of naval stores, hemp, iron, pitch, &c. which would be perpetually wanting to answer the demands of our exorbitant navy? Are we now equal, (how long shall we be equal?) to the strength and councils of all Europe united against us?—Think not, that I am here arguing in favour of France or Spain: I am pleading for what I humbly take to be the true interests of Great-Britain; a cause not to be supported by mere dint of expence and valour; but by expence and valour, assisted by justice and moderation, and united with humanity and policy.

May it not therefore be suggested, (and this is the conclusion I am aiming at) that in the most fa-

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vourable

vourable view of our present situation, and even supposing a certainty of new successes, upon a continuation of the war; may it not, I say, be humbly suggested, that the best use we can *now* make of our past conquests, is to purchase a present peace with them; and that the surest way to continue our triumphs over the weakness of our enemies, is to turn this weakness to our own true and lasting profit, in settling the terms of a speedy accommodation with them. Having acquired so much glory by our arms, the praise of moderation is the only remaining honour which we can now aspire to; an honour so much the greater, as it may be hoped that it will be durable; and when united with that of prudence, be attended with the most solid and essential advantages to our country.

II.

What sort of a Peace Great-Britain has reason to expect.

IT is so, says even the most sanguine advocate for continuing war; peace in itself, to be sure, is preferable to war; and “*make peace as soon as you can,*” is the language of the whole nation in general, from the highest to the lowest.—For openly to plead for perpetuating a consuming war, however successful it may hitherto have been, and be still likely to prove, without suffering our ears to be seriously opened to proposals of accommodation, is a language so entirely foreign to the first principles of right reason, humanity and religion, that no one will dare to avow it.

The whole difficulty, therefore, lies in settling the terms of the future pacification between us and our enemies; and upon this important point it is that those, who delight in war, triumph.—Upon this point it is, that the confusion, the clamour, the discord and the contradiction begin: *Give us the Havannah, or we are undone*; says one. *Secure the monopoly of the cod-fisheries,* says another, *or we are absolutely ruined.* *We will have no peace,* adds a

third, *without the cession of the most considerable sugar-islands. All Canada, and all Louisiana, are essential to our safety; is the voice of others.—Why will you render your slave and gum trade precarious, by parting with either of your African conquests? The French East-India company, are now ruined; exclude them for ever from the traffick of those rich countries.*

—Nor do I know of any place, except the poor island of Belleisle, which has not found an eager and powerful advocate in its favour, for uniting it forever to the crown of Great-Britain.

But after all; Is not this the voice of arrogance, of passion, of prejudice, and of partial self-interest, rather than the dictates of sound sense and true policy? The contractor, the broker, the avaritious money-changer, the factious courtier, the ambitious soldier, and the impetuous sailor, are against a peace in general;—whilst the North American merchant, the West Indian merchant, the African merchant, the Levant merchant, and the East Indian merchant, are not against a peace in general, but only against a peace which does not immediately consult and provide for the particular advantages of that branch of business and commerce, wherein they are engaged, and have all their views, hopes and fortunes embarked.—But if all must be heard, nothing, 'tis certain, can be ceded; and consequently we can never have a peace.

—But

—But if all cannot, and must not be heard, ought it not to be left, where the *constitution* leaves it, namely, to his Majesty's wisdom to determine, what shall be ceded, and what kept, as it appears to him most expedient for the universal good?

Seeing, therefore, it is absolutely impossible that every body should be equally pleased, as every body's private interest cannot equally be provided for, all that the administration seems to have to do, is to pursue with vigour and earnestness, what appears to them to be the general and truly essential interests of their country; and to endeavour to please the reasonable, honest, and thinking part of the nation. They certainly will please all the reasonable, thinking, and honest part of the nation, of what profession soever they be, *if they can conclude a good peace: a good peace, relatively to the nation in general, rather than to the partial interests of individuals, or of particular bodies of men.*

Let us therefore now go on to inquire, with the same uprightness and honest impartiality, which have hitherto conducted our sentiments, and guided our pen, *what are the properties essentially necessary to constitute a good national peace?*

That peace well deserves to be esteemed, and certainly will be denominated a good peace by every honest
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and reasonable person in the nation, the stipulations of which being undoubtedly safe, honourable, and advantageous, probably will be lasting.

Here then let us fix; to this point let us immovably adhere, that *the essentials of a good peace are safety, honour, advantage, and duration.*—

1. *And is not that peace sufficiently safe, which brings all reasonable security to our extensive frontiers? which places our enemies at a considerable distance from our most remote and worst inhabited territories? which permits our manufacturers to follow their trades, and our husbandmen and planters to cultivate their fields, without fear or apprehensions of danger? which cuts off all past controversies, and prevents, as far as human foresight can prevent, all future occasion of dispute about doubtful property? which leaves nothing to the tedious discussion of commissaries? and is as clear, precise, and determinate in its terms, as language can make it?*

2. *And ought not that peace to be termed honourable, (it certainly will meet with that appellation from every honest and reasonable person in the nation) which is conducted with dignity and good faith, without having recourse to the mean base and undermining artifices of a narrow, selfish and momentary*

mentary policy? which is founded upon the eternal and unchangeable principles of humanity, justice, and moderation? which fully obtains all the ends for which the war was originally begun? and which consults and prescribes for the real interests and safety of our allies, as far as we are required by treaties, to interpose in their favour?

3. *And is not that an advantageous peace,* (and will it not be so reputed by every reasonable and honest man in the nation?) which stipulates new conditions in favour of our general commerce? which opens fresh ports for the benefit of our own navigation, and closes others to the great disadvantage of our rivals in trade? which furnishes new species of commodities for the profit of our merchants, and the industry of our manufacturers, and supplies larger quantities of those well known commodities, whose great utility to the nation has been long experienced?

4. *And is not a peace, which fixes the public and private security upon a lasting foundation; which is conducted with good faith, and animated with the principles of humanity, justice, and moderation; which cuts off all present, and removes all probable occasions of future disputes with our enemies; which stipulates new advantages in favour of our own commerce, and lessens the resource of our enemies; which is as unequivocal,*

equivocal, as is in the power of language to make it; and which is moreover guarantied in the most solemn manner, by the nations principally concerned and interested in the several stipulations, likely to prove, as far as human foresight can judge, a lasting peace?

1. If then all Canada, in its utmost extent, as described by our own maps from memoirs furnished by the board of trade, be ceded to us in perpetuity by the French, all farther contests about the limits of Acadia and Nova Scotia, the principal origin of the war, will be forever cut off.

If the respective boundaries of Virginia, Carolina and Georgia, on the one hand, and of Louisiana on the other (to which country we have no claim either from conquest for rom any other plea of right) be clearly and explicitly settled, and a large tract of neutral land left between them for the use of the Indians, upon which it shall be expressly stipulated, that no forts of any kind shall be erected by either nation; what possible room will there be left for us to apprehend any future danger for our colonies in that part of the world?

And if the Spaniards, in part of what we may reasonably expect from them, in return for the Havannah, could be persuaded to cede and guarantee to us, that tract of Florida which still be-

annihilated, would do well to consider, how far it is in our power to put this exterminating plan in execution; and whether, when executed, it would serve the purpose which they think may be expected from it.—For when the French are utterly subdued, shall we not still be as unsecure, and as unsafe, as we were before, whilst we have any neighbours left to raise our suspicions, and to fill us with jealousies? And if we are not to think ourselves safe and secure, from the machinations of our enemy, till there be no probability left of our being hereafter attacked by them, we must, I fear, wage eternal war with all the rest of the world.

2. By the acquisition of Canada; by settling the boundaries of Louisiana, so that there may be a considerable space of country between that province, and the limits of our colonies of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia; by keeping the prizes taken before the declaration of war; by treating our enemies with justice and moderation; by the recovery of Minorca, the only place of ours remaining in their hands; and by securing to our German allies, and to Portugal, the entire possession of their several countries and territories, as they enjoyed them before the commencement of the war,—the point of honour between us and our enemies will be compleatly obtained; and a peace made upon these conditions, will be as honourable

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to the nation, as the war has been successful and glorious.

3. By the absolute possession of Canada; by the quiet enjoyment of Goree and Senegal; by an irrevocable permission from the court of Spain to cut logwood in the bay of Campeachy; by the final giving up either of all the neutral islands, or of some of the neutral islands and Porto Rico; by the cession of Cape Breton, and St. John's, and the restitution of Minorca——

A prodigious extent of country will be secured to us for ever; the monopoly of American furs will be put into our hands; our slave, and gum, and dying trades, will be ensured and considerably augmented; our West Indian commerce for sugar, rum, &c. &c. will be rendered more plentiful and inexhaustible; the Newfoundland cod fishery, will, in a measure, be entirely in our power; and our Mediterranean trade be much facilitated.

And will not a peace concluded upon these terms tend to augment our general commerce, to increase the number of our seamen, and consequently be greatly advantageous to the true, solid, and essential interests of the nation?

But you ask me, Why will you not use the power which victory has put into your hands, to exclude

the French for ever from all liberty of fishing for cōd upon the banks of Newfoundland? Not because we do not clearly see and acknowledge, and are desirous of acquiring, the manifest advantage which would accrue to the nation from such an exclusive property in the fisheries; but because the French perceive, and are convinced of the great importance of these fisheries, as well as we, and will not be persuaded upon any consideration whatever, (as appears by the negociations and concessions of the last year) to give up the right of catching fish, (for themselves at least :) A right, conveyed and secured to them in the most solemn manner by past treaties.

If, therefore, an absolutely exclusive right to the Newfoundland fisheries cannot possibly be obtained, and maintained by us, we ought to be contented with a clear and express stipulation, which will come little short of it, and which will be fully sufficient to answer all our real wants of security and profit.—We ought to be contented that the French are for ever deprived of Cape Breton; and not permitted to have any other military establishment, in that part of the world, but what will be merely sufficient to maintain an internal police amongst their fishermen, and that under the continual visitation and inspection of a British commissary.

Having

Having thus taken sufficient care of the safety, honour, and advantage of the nation, the rest of our conquests may chearfully be given up and returned to our enemies, as a cheap purchase for the amiable character of moderation ; as a cheap purchase for our future ease, quiet, and tranquillity.—

A peace concluded with our enemies upon the reasonable terms above mentioned, as it will abundantly convince the disinterested parts of Europe, of the spirit of equity and true policy, which influence and govern our councils ; as it will tend to satisfy even our enemies themselves, that we are not seeking their destruction, but our own safety, security, and prosperity ; so may we reasonably conclude, agreeable to the soundest principles of human wisdom and probability, that it will be *durable*. And will not the conditions of a peace pushed farther, relatively to ourselves, and made upon other principles than have been here described, demonstrate to all the world, that the war we are engaged in, is a war of ambition and interest, rather than of necessity and self-defence ? An unreasonably favourable peace, could it, thro' the extreme weakness of our exhausted enemies, be obtained, would certainly be as insidious, as it would be universally invidious ; it would rather deserve the *name of a short truce than of a good peace*.

A good peace is all we can, is all we ought to wish for; and a peace which is safe, honourable, and advantageous, and probably will be lasting, is a good peace, without tormenting our heated brains, with fancying that it might be still more safe, more honourable, more advantageous, and more lasting.

To expect that the French and Spaniards should make a *lasting peace* with us, upon the terms which some extravagant people are desirous that his majesty should endeavour to exact from them, namely, that they should cede unto us forever, all the conquests which we have hitherto made upon them, and should moreover oblige themselves (as Carthage formerly did to imperious Rome) never to build any new men of war, but with the express consent and permission of Great Britain, is to demand of them little less than to surrender themselves into our power, bound hands and feet, to be treated as shall seem good to our sovereign's will and pleasure.

So again, to talk of procuring an immediate, present and adequate indemnification, for the immense expences we have been at in the most extensive war the nation has ever been engaged in, is to talk a language which the smallest degree of sober attention will demonstrate, never can be
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complied with. The future use we make of a peace, must be our indemnification for the enormous charges of the past war ; and a full, ample, sure, and sufficient indemnification, it certainly will prove, if the arts of peace be duly studied, cultivated, and improved by the King, the parliament, and the people.

November 6th, 1762.

Advertisement.

LEST it should be asked by the Reader, why the Author of the foregoing pages has said so little in them concerning the affairs of the East Indies? it may not, perhaps, be improper for him to observe in his vindication, that he does not clearly see how the settlement of the disputes between the East India companies of England and France, can with any propriety belong to the Kings of England and France, who have not, he presumes, the direct dominion of any territory in those countries, and who have all along acted, rather as auxiliaries to the East India *companies* of their respective nations, than as principals in the war.

Besides, it does not appear, that any great difficulty was made in the negotiations of last year upon this head; it having been agreed on both sides, *that the final settlement of affairs in the East Indies, should be left to the East Indian Companies of the two nations, consistent with the general intention of their sovereigns.* And as the *uti possidetis* is to be the basis of the future treaty, till this settlement be made to the mutual satisfaction of both nations, we are entitled to enjoy, and make the most of our conquests in that part of the world.